DeBoer, Baker, and Summary Dispositions: In Defense of Appellate Court Restraint by Hafner, James M., Jr.
Vol. 76] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 131 
SIXTH CIRCUIT REVIEW  
DeBoer, Baker, and Summary Dispositions:  
In Defense of Appellate Court Restraint 
JAMES M. HAFNER, JR.* 
Commenting on DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
[T]he earlier and vast precedential jurisprudence arising out of pre-
1988 summary dispositions of appeals . . . remains in effect. Perhaps 
the passage of time will cause those enigmatic precedents to fade. But 
their continuing existence can haunt both lower courts and the bar.1  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
On November 6, 2014, a divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit handed down one of the most 
consequential circuit court decisions in recent memory, DeBoer v. 
Snyder.2 Though critics and defenders have seized on the better-known 
aspects of the majority’s analysis, little attention has been paid to the 
majority’s treatment of an important issue: the role of a lower federal 
court when addressing a binding Supreme Court summary disposition 
that appears to rest on questionable legal foundations. After contrasting 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate 2015, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Thanks to 
Professor Edward B. Foley and Furthermore Editor Jared Hasson, whose advice and 
guidance enriched this Comment. All mistakes are the author’s.  
 1 EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 310 (9th ed. 2007). 
 2 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).  
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the majority’s approach with two notable and thoughtful dissents, this 
Comment concludes that the majority’s summary disposition 
methodology comports with Court teachings and preserves the proper 
role of lower courts in our hierarchical federal court system.  
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND DOCTRINAL 
FRAMEWORK 
To understand why the Sixth Circuit split so dramatically on the 
summary disposition question, a brief description of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction is in order. When a party seeks to obtain Supreme 
Court review, it must rely on either: (1) the Court’s discretionary [or 
certiorari] jurisdiction;3 or (2) mandatory [or appellate] jurisdiction.4 As 
its name implies, the latter category allows parties to seek—and requires 
the Court to grant—review of certain types of lower court decisions. 
Prior to 1988, the Court’s docket was dominated by cases that arose 
out of its mandatory jurisdiction.5 Overburdened,6 the Court responded 
by ramping up its use of summary dispositions, which are a frequently 
invoked device by which the Court disposes of cases without oral 
argument or full briefing.7 Unfortunately, summary dispositions usually 
contain little to no legal reasoning, leaving lower courts perplexed8 and 
critics seething.9 After the Court acknowledged that summary 
dispositions do not bind it to the same extent as a full opinion on the 
merits,10 these lower courts and critics began to wonder whether lower 
courts had similar leeway. 
In Hicks v. Miranda, the Court answered this question with an 
emphatic “no,” chastising a recalcitrant district court for refusing to 
apply a summary disposition.11 Rejecting the argument that summary 
dispositions bind lower courts with less force than full opinions, the 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 234–98.  
 4 Id. at 298–310.  
 5 Id. at 298.  
 6 See Letter from Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Congressman 
Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982), in H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 27–29 (1988) 
[hereinafter Burger Letter].  
 7 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 298–99 (detailing summary disposition 
statistics).  
 8 Burger Letter, supra note 6, at 28.  
 9 E.g., David W. Brown, Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The 
Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U. L. REV. 
373, 381–91, 411–12 (1972). 
 10 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670–71 (1974). 
 11 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1975). 
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Court wrote, “[the lower court] was not free to disregard [the summary 
disposition],” which it made clear was a decision “on the merits of [a] 
case.”12 The Court, however, hedged a bit in its conclusion, writing 
“unless and until [we] should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts 
had best adhere to the view that if [we have] branded a question as 
unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments 
indicate otherwise.”13  
It is this “doctrinal developments” language that sharply divides the 
majority and dissent in DeBoer over their authority to adjudicate the 
same-sex marriage issue. To be sure, it is not unreasonable to read the 
language as permitting a lower court to disregard a summary disposition 
that is inconsistent with more recent (and broader) principles the Court 
has articulated. Such a reading, however, would threaten to eviscerate 
Hicks itself, casting doubt on the innumerable summary dispositions 
that have not been expressly overruled. Especially in light of the 
Roberts Court’s busy summary docket,14 lower courts need a disciplined 
approach to addressing summary dispositions. The DeBoer majority’s 
approach—which comports with Court teachings and preserves the 
proper role of lower courts in our hierarchical federal court system—is 
the proper approach.  
III. THREE DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO BAKER  
A. DeBoer Majority: Baker Controls 
More than forty years ago, in Baker v. Nelson, a gay couple relied 
on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to challenge a same-
sex marriage ban, but was unsuccessful in state court.15 Invoking the 
Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction, the couple appealed, and the 
Court issued a twelve-word summary disposition rejecting the claim for 
                                                                                                                     
 12 Id. at 344 (citations omitted).  
 13 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Since Hicks, the Court has reaffirmed the 
view that summary dispositions prevent lower courts from reaching opposite conclusions 
on the “precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 785–86 n.5 (1983); Ill. Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 
440 U.S. 173, 182–83 (1979) (citations omitted). The leading Supreme Court practice 
treatise has noted the Court’s “repeated admonition that these summary rulings were 
decisions on the merits that lower courts were bound to respect and follow as binding 
precedents.” GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 310. 
 14 E.g., Kevin Russell, An Increase in the Court’s Summary Docket, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Feb. 16, 2010, 11:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/an-increase-in-the-court% 
E2%80%99s-summary-docket [http://perma.cc/85YD-ZYB4]. 
 15 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
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lack of a “substantial federal question.”16 As developed through later 
precedent,17 the Court’s disposition signified that neither the Equal 
Protection nor Due Process Clause required states to recognize the 
couple’s marriage as valid.  
In DeBoer, plaintiffs claimed that the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to 
recognize their marriages.18 Writing for the two-judge majority, Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton began his analysis by invoking the perspective of an 
intermediate court, which required considering “what the Supreme 
Court’s precedents require on the topic at hand.”19 After discussing the 
lower court’s reasoning in Baker, the majority noted that the Baker 
Court rejected the precise Fourteenth Amendment claim raised by the 
plaintiffs.20 Deeming itself bound by the Court’s summary decisions 
“until such time as the Court informs [us] that [we] [are] not,” the 
majority concluded that Baker stands for the proposition that the gay 
marriage bans violate neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Due 
Process Clause.21  
The majority then turned to the dissent’s principal claim: that 
“subsequent doctrinal developments”—specifically United States v. 
Windsor,22 Lawrence v. Texas,23 and Romer v. Evans24—indicate that 
Baker no longer binds lower courts.25 After distinguishing each case, 
the majority arrives at the heart of the summary disposition issue: 
whether the “doctrinal developments” language in Hicks is capacious 
enough to encompass subsequent decisions that—while arguably 
distinguishable—nevertheless suggest that the Court’s reasoning on the 
issue may have changed.  
Per the DeBoer majority, Agostini v. Felton26 tells a lower court that 
if Supreme Court precedent “has direct application in a case, yet 
                                                                                                                     
 16 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). 
 17 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (explaining that 
summary dispositions bind lower courts on the “precise issues presented and necessarily 
decided” by the lower court opinion).  
 18 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014). After brief consideration, the 
majority disposed of certain plaintiffs’ constitutional right to travel challenges. See id. at 
420. 
 19 Id. at 399.  
 20 Id. at 400.  
 21 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345 (1975)). 
 22 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 24 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 25 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 400–02.  
 26 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).  
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appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,” an 
appellate court “should follow the case which directly controls, leaving 
to [the Supreme Court] the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”27 Synthesizing its understanding of the Court’s summary 
disposition jurisprudence, the DeBoer majority articulates its rule on 
summary dispositions: lower courts are free to disregard otherwise-
binding Court precedent only where the Court has overruled the 
disposition (1) by name28 or (2) by outcome.29  
To illustrate its understanding of the second category, the Sixth 
Circuit employed a hypothetical. If the Supreme Court had held in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry30 that California’s gay marriage ban violated 
either the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause, but neglected 
to mention Baker, lower courts would be free to disregard Baker and 
could instead apply Hollingsworth. In other words, the majority 
construes “by outcome” narrowly, suggesting only a direct overruling 
on the precise legal issue presented would suffice. After determining 
this condition is not met, the majority concludes its treatment of the 
Baker issue.31  
A substantial argument exists that the majority’s approach is stricter 
than Hicks and its progeny require.32 Nevertheless, especially when 
contrasted with the dissenting approaches, three reasons suggest that the 
majority approach should be retained. First, such a reading is consistent 
with the Agostini principle, which reminds lower courts to refrain from 
overruling Court precedent, directly or otherwise. Second, it adequately 
accounts for the fact that innumerable summary dispositions remain on 
the books,33 and allowing them to be uprooted by a mere shift in the 
doctrinal winds risks aggrandizing the circuits at the Court’s expense. 
Third, given the recent uptick in summary dispositions, the majority’s 
approach ensures that lower courts are not left “upstream without a 
paddle” as they attempt to contrast the rationales underlying more 
recent opinions with necessarily-rationale-lacking summary 
                                                                                                                     
 27 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 401 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).  
 28 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986). 
 29 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 401.  
 30 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (dismissing for lack of standing 
plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment challenge to California’s gay marriage ban).  
 31 Two other circuit judges have concluded the same. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 
1193, 1231–34 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bostic 
v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 385–98 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 32 See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.  
 33 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 310.  
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dispositions. A comparison with two opposing views highlights why the 
majority’s approach should be retained.  
B. DeBoer Dissent: Baker “Lacks Only a Stake Through Its Heart” 
Like most federal courts to address the issue post-Windsor, Judge 
Daughtrey views Baker as irrelevant to the constitutional status of the 
same-sex marriage bans. The thread that unites the dissent and other 
courts distinguishing Baker is reliance on the “doctrinal developments 
indicate otherwise” language in Hicks.  
Applying the doctrinal developments exception to Baker, the dissent 
notes that when Baker was decided, most states still had active “anti-
sodomy” laws, a crucial factual distinction that the dissent argues 
removes much of Baker’s force.34 Next, the dissent points out that 
Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—all post-Baker gay rights 
jurisprudence—fail to mention Baker, an omission that suggests the 
Court itself regards Baker as dead letter.35 The dissent concludes by 
referring to the Court’s October 6, 2014 orders denying certiorari in a 
trio of cases striking down state gay marriage bans.36 If it were truly 
error to refuse to apply Baker, so the argument goes, would not the 
Court have intervened?  
At first glance, this argument has considerable force, especially 
insofar as it relies on precedent that scholars believe the Court will 
extend in holding that the Constitution prevents states from denying gay 
couples marriage equality.37 The problem with the dissent’s approach is 
that it conflates—or at least does not properly account for—the task of 
lower courts versus the Supreme Court when addressing otherwise-
binding Court precedent that appears to have been subsequently 
indirectly undermined. 
The dissent provides little support for the proposition that the Hicks 
dicta—espoused in a case where the Court admonished and reversed a 
lower court’s attempt to circumvent a summary disposition—was meant 
to create a free-standing exception to the rule that lower courts are 
bound by summary dispositions “until such time as the Court informs 
[them] that [they] are not.”38 Indeed, post-Hicks guidance indicates 
                                                                                                                     
 34 DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 430 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).  
 35 Id. at 431. 
 36 Id.  
 37 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Review Symposium 2014—Keynote by Erwin 
Chemerinsky, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 447, 450–451 (2014).  
 38 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
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otherwise.39 Absent some clearer limiting principle, the dissent’s 
approach creates an exception to Hicks that threatens to swallow the 
rule. Especially given the perceived recent uptick in summary 
dispositions and the thousands that remain good law, such a departure 
threatens the predictability and stability that has been a hallmark of our 
hierarchical federal court system for decades.40 
C. Judge Posner: An Alternative Approach to Distinguishing Baker 
The Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion deserves attention insofar as 
it (1) was written by a highly-regarded federal judge and (2) adopts a 
slightly different (but potentially important) approach to the Baker 
issue.41 Before striking down state gay marriage bans, Judge Richard 
Posner cited42 two circuit cases, the first of which declined to find that a 
doctrinal development indicated otherwise, instead invoking (1) the 
Hicks principle and (2) the distinction between lower courts and federal 
courts when considering summary dispositions. 
Far more important (for purposes of this Comment) is the second 
opinion the Baskin v. Bogan majority cites: Soto-Lopez v. New York 
City.43 Though Judge Posner does not discuss Soto-Lopez, he appears to 
cite it for the proposition that a circuit court has applied the Hicks dicta 
to free itself from the strictures of an otherwise-binding summary 
disposition.44  
Although not without merit, the Seventh Circuit’s use of Soto-Lopez 
would require the case to carry more weight than it seems capable of 
bearing. Though one circuit’s one-time use of the “doctrinal 
developments indicate otherwise” language is not irrelevant to 
determining its scope, it confronts a formidable line of Court precedent 
holding that summary dispositions are binding decisions on the merits 
and should be accorded proper respect. Without more, the court’s 
opinion in Soto-Lopez is better viewed as an aberration in precedent 
than a novel departure from the rule of Hicks and its progeny.  
                                                                                                                     
 39 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 785–86 n.5 (1983); Ill. Elections Bd. v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182–83 (1979); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 
176 (1977) (per curiam). 
 40 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818–26, 839–56 (1994).  
 41 Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 42 Id. at 659–60 (citing United States v. Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 
2004)).  
 43 Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 755 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 44 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 659–60.  
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But is there more? Though the impact of Soto-Lopez on Hicks has 
never been discussed at length, a review of the Second Circuit’s opinion 
and, especially, the Supreme Court’s subsequent affirmance, suggests 
that Hicks itself has been weakened. Soto-Lopez involved a 
constitutional challenge to a New York statute that provided preferential 
employment treatment to veterans who resided in New York before 
joining the military, but not veterans who moved to New York after 
doing so.45  
As the district court recognized, the Court had rejected—in a 
summary disposition—an identical constitutional challenge to the 
identical New York veterans benefit scheme only eleven years prior.46 
Though it agreed that the summary disposition was “on all fours with 
the present case,” the Second Circuit nonetheless read an intervening 
Court precedent—which found an equal protection violation in an 
Alaska statute that distributed income from the State’s natural resources 
on the basis of length of residency47—as “undermin[ing]” the summary 
disposition.48 After concluding that the summary disposition could “no 
longer be deemed to reflect the Supreme Court’s view,” the Second 
Circuit deemed itself “free to examine [the New York statute] with a 
fresh eye . . . .”49 
Though the Second Circuit’s approach is a jarring departure from 
Hicks—which New York repeatedly emphasized in its brief50—the 
Supreme Court did not seem to mind. Far from admonishing the lower 
court for “implicitly overrul[ing]” the summary disposition in 
contravention of Hicks, the Court adopted much of the Second Circuit’s 
approach51 and overruled the summary disposition in a footnote.52 In 
doing so, it favorably cited53 the Second Circuit for recognizing that the 
Court’s overruling “may be inferred” from the intervening precedents.54  
Properly understood, then, Soto-Lopez appears to stand for the 
precise proposition the DeBoer majority rejects: a lower court’s 
authority to effectively overrule binding summary dispositions extends 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Soto-Lopez, 755 F.2d at 268–69.  
 46 August v. Bronstein, 417 U.S. 901, 901 (1974). 
 47 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). 
 48 Soto-Lopez, 755 F.2d at 274. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Brief of Appellant at 17–20, New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (No. 
84-1803) (“A more direct indication of a doctrinal change by this Court must exist, 
however, before a lower court departs from a clearly established precedent of this Court.”). 
 51 Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907–12.  
 52 Id. at 912 n.9.  
 53 Id. at 909.  
 54 Id. at 908 (emphasis added).  
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beyond instances where intervening Court precedent has overruled the 
decision by name or by outcome.55 However—while a full 
consideration of the issue is beyond the scope of this case comment—
four reasons suggest that Soto-Lopez should not be read so broadly.  
First, such a reading seems inconsistent with the subsequent 
Agostini principle. Second, the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
acknowledged Soto-Lopez’s effect on the Hicks principle, and caution 
suggests that such a cataclysmic shift in summary disposition 
jurisprudence should come from the Court directly, rather than via 
implication. Third, given the recent increase in summary dispositions, 
weakening their binding effect could leave lower courts “upstream 
without a paddle” in the manner described above. Finally, recent 
decisions—without mentioning Soto-Lopez—have affirmed the status of 
summary dispositions as binding adjudications on the merits. 
Accordingly, this alternative way to understand the Court’s summary 
disposition jurisprudence suffers from notable shortcomings, and the 
DeBoer majority’s approach charts the better course.  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
As the reader is undoubtedly aware, the DeBoer plaintiffs 
successfully petitioned for certiorari. When the Court delivers its much-
anticipated decision, it should relegate Baker to its proper place in 
American constitutional history: a footnote, as a relic of an era long-
since passed.56 For many of the reasons outlined in the DeBoer dissent, 
the Court should breeze past the enigmatic Baker—which has 
“haunt[ed]”57 lower courts and gay couples alike—en route to 
concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to recognize 
same sex marriages.58 Though its result is to the contrary, the DeBoer 
majority should be lauded for its faithful application of binding Court 
                                                                                                                     
 55 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 400–02 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 56 See, e.g., Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 901, 912 n.9 (1986) (overruling a previous 
summary disposition in a footnote). 
 57 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 310.  
 58 On what grounds? Though comprehensive analysis is (well) beyond this 
Comment’s scope, the author would hold that straightforward equal protection analysis 
requires that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation survive “intermediate” 
scrutiny, specifically that it be “substantially related” to “important governmental 
objectives.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Though the states have yet to file 
their respective briefs in the pending case, the interests asserted in DeBoer—(1) some 
formulation of vox populi and (2) channeling opposite sex couples’ unique procreative 
power in a way that benefits society—would fall well short of this standard.  
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precedent and proper understanding of its own role in our federal court 
system. 
